How to plan and execute the largest military campaign in history? Find it out in 1-3.5 player, 90 minutes logistic take on Barbarossa.
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After Action Report (And the Final Poll!)
over 4 years ago
– Fri, Dec 06, 2019 at 04:33:12 PM
Hello Everyone,
Today we are going to present you a fresh AAR (After Action Report) from a 3.5 player game, which was played by four veteran 1944 Race to the Rhine players. It shows how the Stavka Game Variant works and how exciting it can be, even for grognards.
The Final Poll
Thank you for your votes in the Fourth Poll. You have chosen clearly that the next stretch goal is three HQ counters upgraded to plastic Mercedes-Benz W31 Wehrmacht Staff Car miniatures in player colours. And this sweet upgrade will be yours if we cross the £85.000 mark. You will need also 100 interactions, but you still have 345 (595 collected minus 250 already spent). So, here you will find the next poll for our campaign:
It will be live by Sunday night. This is the final poll for this campaign. The order of stretch goals for the final campaign days will be set by number of your votes under each remaining option. So please vote now!
We have also generated the final set of social media posts in order to let you collect interactions for the final stretch goal assault. Please like, share, and comment on these posts to invite people for the final part of our offensive! :)
1941 Race to Moscow is our fourth campaign run in 2019. But we aren’t forgetting about the previous ones. The first - Freedom! - is currently shipping out to our backers. The second - Europe Divided - is in production now. The third - Successors - just launched the pledge manager (and we have just started production of plastic pieces for this one). Please note that you can pre-order Successors and Hannibal & Hamilcar games as add-ons during this campaign, which helps achieving the stretch goals! We hope that this track record ensures you that PHALANX is a publisher that you can trust.
In the AAR above you have seen how the Barbarossa Campaign’s history was forged by 1941 Race to Moscow players. But what has happened in reality?
ARMY GROUP NORTH’S CAMPAIGN IN 1941
From the outset of Operation Barbarossa, Army Group North, with 30 divisions led by Field Marshal Wilhelm von Leeb, was tasked with advancing from East Prussia toward Leningrad. Finland was to coordinate its offensive across the southeastern border with the Werhmacht’s High Command (OKW). By the end of June 1941, the thrust forward had developed according to the plans: The Dvina had been crossed at Jakobstadt and Dünaburg. Manstein's corps had moved swiftly: the 4th Panzer Group had reached the Dvina River, 315 km distant, in just 100 hours! The Luftwaffe had gained total air supremacy. In a series of desperate delaying actions, the Soviets had already lost 12 to 15 divisions. During the Battle of Raseiniai (June 23-27), most of the Soviet armor of the Northwestern Front commanded by General Fyodor Kuznetsov was destroyed (c. 700 tanks).
During the month of July, the Army Group North area 16th Army fought its way eastward against stubborn resistance in the difficult terrain east of Opochka, while the 3rd Panzer Group had turned northward, advancing between Lakes Ilmen and Peipus toward Leningrad. The two armored corps of the 4th Panzer Group became separated during the course of their advance. Hitler, who visited Army Group North headquarters on July 22, considered that the capture of Leningrad would lead to a complete collapse of the Soviet system. During that phase, von Richthofen’s VIII Air Corps’ top priority was to provide air support for Army Group North’s ground operations.
General Hoepner's 4th Panzer Group managed to reach Novgorod by the 16th of August. The fortress of Novgorod was destroyed by Richthofen's Ju 87s. The three forces encountered stubborn Soviet resistance, and their progress was slow. On August 30, German forces finally reached Leningrad’s suburbs and the shores of Lake Ladoga, severing Soviet ground communications with the city. VIII Air Corps supported the German 18th Army in forcing the Soviet 54th Army from the shores of Lake Ladoga. By 24 September, Army Group North halted its advance and transferred the 4th Panzer Group to Army Group Center in preparation for Operation Typhoon. Resolution had been taken by the High Command that Leningrad would be besieged, its population starved into submission, rather than trying to conquer the city by force. A direct attack on the Leningrad was expressly forbidden by Hitler. The Finns had halted their advance, moving their troops to East Karelia. Army Group North, receiving supplies via Baltic sea transport, enjoyed an overall better situation than the other Army Groups.
In November, Soviet forces repelled a renewed German offensive south of Lake Ilmen and clung to tenuous resupply routes across the frozen waters of Lake Ladoga. The Germans were pushed back to the Volkhov. German and Soviet strategic attention then shifted to the push for Moscow which had become the Wehrmacht High Command's priority. Thus, Leningrad would endure an 872-day prolonged siege of unparalleled severity. Insufficient food and fuel supplies reached the city by barge in the summer, and by truck and ice-borne sled in winter across Lake Ladoga under constant air attacks, on what became known as the “Road of Life”. From mid-December, the Red Army and NKPS pioneers also started building a railroad on the ice of Lake Ladoga itself. It would be completed in February 1942. Up to two million lives would be lost, including about 800,000 civilians (c. 40% of the population), most of the victims dying of hunger and exposure during the extreme winter of 1941-42 when daily rations dropped to just 125 grams of bread per person.
ARMY GROUP CENTER IN 1941: FORWARD TO MOSCOW
In the spring of 1941, Army Group Center, commanded by Field Marshal Fedor von Bock, was tasked with taking the route north of the Pripyat Marshes, heading to Moscow. Its armies would push towards Minsk and Smolensk, and attempt to destroy the Soviet armies stationed there by encirclement. Von Bock had 51 divisions under his command, including Luftflotte 2 led by Field Marshal Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen, the 4th and 9th Armies, the 2nd and 3rd Panzer Groups.
Two weeks after the start of Operation Barbarossa, the Soviet forces west of Minsk had been completely encircled. Guderian’s 2nd and Hoth’s 3rd Panzer Groups had linked up, according to plans, while the 9th and 4th German Armies had also linked up east of Białystok, splitting the encircled Soviet forces into two pockets: a smaller Białystok pocket containing the Soviet 10th Army, and a larger Novogrudok pocket containing the 3rd and 13th Armies. Minsk fell on the 26th of June, 20 Soviet divisions were wiped out, and the Germans captured 290,000 prisoners. The Soviets were isolated and more or less encircled, but continued to resist east of Mogilev, between Orsha and Smolensk, northeast of Vitebsk, and near Nevel. Soviet Colonel Ggeneral Dmitry Pavlov had been relieved of his command on 1 July 1941. He would soon be tried and executed. Stalin placed Field Marshal Semyon Timoshenko in command and transferred five armies out of the strategic reserve.
After Minsk, Smolensk was taken at the end of July in another successful pincer operation, with an additional 300,000 Soviet soldiers captured. At this stage, Hitler, who visited Army Center’s headquarters on the 4th of August, ordered the attack to turn north (with 3rd Panzer Group) and south (2nd Panzer Group) to eliminate Soviet forces at Leningrad and Kiev. Von Bock favored a direct drive toward Moscow, but he was overruled. Army Group Center had to proceed toward Moscow temporarily without its armor. Von Bock then supervised the planning of Operation Typhoon: the Soviet capital had to be taken by 7 November, before the onset of winter, and to coincide with the anniversary of the Russian Revolution. However, the battles of Kiev and Uman delayed the push to Moscow since the capture of Leningrad and eastern Ukraine were given priority, and thus the Germans lost six precious weeks.
Soviet resistance near Vyazma provided time for the Soviet High Command to reinforce the four armies defending Moscow. The German troops broke through the Bryansk Front on 30 September, during the operation to encircle the 50th Army. By the end of October, the Germans had destroyed all of the Red Army forces defending the southern approaches to Moscow. The final objective seemed close. Some 658,000 prisoners were taken around Vyazma and Bryansk. By then, cold rain had begun to fall and the roads soon turned into quagmires as part of the Rasputitsa. During the next three weeks (from 14 November to 5 December) the German offensive ground to a halt along the entire front. The Soviets began to launch heavy attacks as early as 16 November, as they gradually seized the initiative. On 29 November, elements of the 4th Panzer Army reached the western suburbs of Moscow.
On the 4th of December some German units reached Kuntsevo. The Wehrmacht had reached its high watermark. On 6 December, with a - 45°C temperature, newly-transferred “Siberian” troops launched a huge counterattack under Zhukov’s command. The German troops were caught unprepared by the sudden outbreak of the harsh Russian winter. German troops retreated all along the front near Moscow. Several days later, the German High Command ordered a halt to all offensive operations. By 13 December, German forces had retreated more than 80km from the capital. The Luftwaffe contributed enormously to the survival of Army Group Center but the German objectives for the Soviet campaign in 1941 had not been attained. The Soviets had eliminated the threat to Moscow. On December 18, von Bock was relieved of his command of Army Group Center. He was replaced by Field Marshal von Kluge. Guderian was also dismissed by 25 December, along with generals Hoepner and Strauss, commanders of the 4th and 9th Panzer Armies.
ARMY GROUP SOUTH: OBJECTIVE THE UKRAINE AND CRIMEA
"I realized, soon after the attack, that everything that had been written about Russia was wrong!" - Gerd von Rundstedt.
Army Group South, commanded by Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, was tasked with invading the Ukraine and capturing its capital Kiev. Afterwards, its divisions would cross the Lower Dnepr and seize Crimea. The Group was given 43 German and 14 Romanian divisions but a single Panzer Group (von Kleist’s 1st Panzer) to reach its objectives. Its air support was provided by Luftflotte 4, commanded by Austrian Colonel General Alexander Löhr.
Following the surprise German attack on June 22, the Soviets, commanded by Colonel General Mikhail Kirponos, were ordered to launch vigorous counterattacks supported by 3,500 tanks, that lasted until the end of the month. "The resistance at the frontier was not too great, but it grew continually as we advanced into the interior of the country. Very strong tank forces, tanks of a better type, far superior to ours, appeared." - von Rundstedt at the High Command Trial, 1948. At the Battle of Brody, Soviet armor (with new KV-1s and T-34s) had to be destroyed by anti-tank weapons and direct air support. On 2 July, the southern section of Army Group South (the Romanian 3rd and 4th Armies, alongside elements of the German 11th Army) invaded Soviet Moldavia. Counterattacks by the Soviet Southern Front's 2nd Mechanized Corps and 9th Army were defeated, but on 9 July the Axis advance stalled along the defenses of the Soviet 18th Army between the Prut and Dniester Rivers.
During the Battle of Uman, the 1st Panzer Group broke through the Soviet Southern Front's lines, leading to the encirclement and annihilation of the Soviet 6th and 12th armies to the southeast of the city of Uman. During the First Battle of Kiev (August-September 1941), the 1st Panzer Group's northward turn from central Ukraine, with the assistance of 2nd Panzer Group's southward advance from Smolensk, led to the encirclement and destruction of the entire Soviet Southwestern Front east of Kiev. The Southwestern Front suffered 700,000 casualties, including 616,000 killed, captured, or missing during the battle, an unprecedented defeat for the Red Army. Kiev fell on 19 September. The offensive was resumed, von Kleist and von Reishenau pushed in the direction of Rostov and Kharkov. On 26 September, a breakthrough was attempted across the fortified Perekop Isthmus, entry to Crimea. Odessa, besieged by the Romanian 4th Army, held behind Axis lines until 16 October.
The supply situation was worsening as the weather deteriorated, but by October 27, Erich von Manstein had managed to enter Crimea with the 11th Army. By 16 November, Manstein had captured all the region, including its capital Simferopol. The fall of Kerch on 16 November left only Sevastopol in Soviet hands. Soviet naval infantry and “Maxim Gorky I” coastal heavy batteries held off the initial attack on Sevastopol. Hitler dictated that the port city had to be taken before the end of the year to improve morale as the invasion of Russia ground to a halt. On December 1st, Hitler relieved von Rundstedt from his command of Army Group South. He had authorized von Kleist’s withdrawal from Rostov. Field Marshal Walter von Reichenau took his place.
At the end of the year, on 26 December the Soviet Black Sea Fleet landed troops on the Kerch Straits to retake Kerch and its peninsula, and on 30 December executed another landing near Feodosiya. The German 46th Infantry division was engaged in heavy fighting. Its Commandant, General Hans von Sponeck, had to order his troops to pull back to avoid the destruction of his unit. He was arrested, tried, and eventually executed in 1944. The fortress of Sevastopol would hold until the 4th of July, leaving Friedrich Paulus’ 6th Army to advance toward Stalingrad and the Caucasus without crucial support.
Written by Dr. Eric G. L. Pinzelli
During the upcoming weekend we won’t post updates and will be less responsive, to get some rest. But we will be back on Monday, for the final 3 days of this campaign. Have a great weekend!
Michał & PHALANX Team
Logistics of Wehrmacht
over 4 years ago
– Thu, Dec 05, 2019 at 05:24:42 PM
Hello Everyone,
Today we will focus entirely on history, as this is the most game-oriented historical note of the entire campaign. Eric has written a capsule about logistics of Wehrmacht and you really have to read it, even if you have skipped all other articles. ;) Enjoy!
LOGISTICS OF THE WEHRMACHT FOR OPERATION BARBAROSSA
“The badness of the roads became our worst handicap. The restoration of railway traffic became delayed by the change of gauge beyond the Russian frontier. The supply problem in the Russian campaign became a very serious problem, complicated by local conditions.” - General of the Infantry Günther Blumentritt in B.H. Liddell Hart, The German Generals Talk, 1948.
Military logistics is the discipline of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of military forces. The outcome of the war against the Soviet Union in great part came down to logistical errors and miscalculations. However, it cannot be said that the OKH didn’t work on that aspect before the offensive. As soon as November 1940, Generalmajor Eduard Wagner, Chief of the Supply and Administration Division, was tasked with preparing logistical exercises that began in December and January. Special emphasis was placed on establishing an efficient supply system in the assembly areas and drawing up a sound base-development plan to guarantee the flow of supplies during the execution of far-reaching operations in the Russian theater.
On February 3, 1941, General Franz Halder, Chief of the OKH General Staff, unfolded the logistical problems and complexity to Hitler for the future offensive against the Soviet Union. The initial transport burden was to fall upon truck transportation, since the Russian rail lines would have to be converted to normal gauge. “Speed! No stops! Do not wait for railway! Do everything with motor vehicles. There must be 'no hold ups', 'that alone guarantees victory!” - Halder, January 1941. It was intended to organize long-distance truck transportation units to haul supplies to distribution points in the field. All transportation matters would have to be coordinated with the Luftwaffe so that no motor vehicle would remain unused. New supply bases were being established in former eastern Poland, and similar installations were to be set up in Romania. Pre-offensive logistic planning showed that an average of 70 tons per day per formation was all that could be delivered. When Hitler was told it was logistically unsound, he went ahead anyway, based on his intuition that the Soviet state would collapse and serious logistical problems would not have time to come into effect.
During February and March, the army groups’ headquarters conducted exercises at army and panzer group levels. The logistical problems were particularly examined. Just prior to the launching of Operation Barbarossa, 91,000 tons of ammunition and half a million tons of fuel (40% of all fuel available to Germany at the time) were stocked along Poland’s border. With the capture of enemy territories, the Germans had to transform the Soviet gauge into German gauge, achieving about 20 km per day. Hans Pottgiesser, (Die Deutsche Reichsbahn im Ostfeldzug,1939-1944), concluded that the rail deployment of the eastern armies and panzer groups, along with their equipment and supplies, required 11,784 trains. During the buildup-phase, 144 trains, traveling at an average speed of 24 km/h, headed east each day. To push for Moscow, Army Group Center needed 33 trains a day, but fewer than 24 were available. As if this was not enough, maps issued for the invasion were often faulty (e.g., some of the roads on them did not exist). It would take a year before accurate new maps were issued to the troops.
By early September, stockpiles were exhausted and newly arriving shipments were immediately distributed to the front-line units, particularly those of Army Group South, where occasional shortages hampered operations. According to General Halder, in July 13,000 tons of supply were required daily for that particular army group, but only 6,500 arrived at the rail heads, and of that only 5,000 or so actually made it to the Divisions. In calculating the requirements for the offensive in the direction of Moscow, the planners found that the daily rate of POL trains arriving in the theater would have to be stepped up from 22 to 27 for the period of 17 September to 2 October and to 29 as of 3 October. At the time, the number of trucks in operating condition had dropped to 77% of T/E strength. Trucks had to bridge the ever-growing distance between the rail-heads and the spearhead of the attack. From 22 June to December 31, the German army transported 136,000,000 tons by truck, by horse another 6,000,000, after it arrived to the rail depots. As time went by and the weather conditions deteriorated, the amount of ammunition delivered dropped after reaching a peak during the summer: 23,077t in June, 101,594t in July, 118,855t in August, 107,870t in September, 90,563t in October, and finally 68,035t in November during the critical phase of Operation Typhoon. As for spare parts, there were over 2,000 different weapons systems used by the German Army, with over a million different spare parts for them, another logistical nightmare. The ammunition consumption of the Ostheer in 1941 amounted to 850 million bullets of pistols and rifles. By the beginning of fall, entire Divisions were lagging behind because they could not receive the supplies they required to move forward. On 27 November 1941, Eduard Wagner, the Quartermaster General of the German Army, reported: “We are at the end of our resources in both personnel and material. We are about to be confronted with the dangers of deep winter.”
Operation Barbarossa failed for a number of reasons. One of them was because of poor logistical planning, faulty intelligence on the logistic capacity, and because the German Army simply didn’t have sufficient motor vehicles, planes, and POL reserves for operations in the vast European Russia theater. The logistics for Barbarossa had been conceived for a short campaign. The inadequacy of the roads, the missing bridges, the scorched earth tactics, and the shortage of suitable air fields made the logistical support almost completely dependent on the damaged railroads. The objectives were far beyond the Wehrmacht’s capability, and a military force that cannot be sustained in the field is always doomed to fail.
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE RAILWAY DURING OPERATION BARBAROSSA
In October of 1940, the Deutsche Reichsbahn and the Eastern Railway (the “Ostbahn”) were ordered to expand the existing German rail network in the east for the future planned invasion of the Soviet Union. The Directorate General of the Eastern Railway (Gedob) presided by Adolf Gerteis was under the control of the Reich Ministry of Transportation of the German Reich, as was the Deutsche Reichsbahn. Their task was to double the existing 3,812 km of rail transportation capacities. In 1939, 84 trains moved eastwards every day. By June of 1941, eight months after the start of the Otto plan (renamed Barbarossa in December of 1940), 220 trains moved eastwards every day. From 1941, the Kriegslokomotiven of the Eastern Railway received operating numbers from the numbering system of the Deutsche Reichsbahn. As more manpower was needed for all these tasks, including driving the trains, “Volksdeutsche” (people of considered German ethnicity and ancestry) were pressed into service, mostly from Austria and Poland. Seven trunk lines and railheads in Eastern Poland on the new Reich-Soviet border were completed by April 1941.
The Three German Army groups were tasked to penetrate as far as they could and seize key Soviet railheads and bridges intact. For Army Group North, the Germans were able to supplement the rail transportation network with seaborne transportation as a result of the excellent maritime networks in existence in the Balkan States. This meant that fewer rail units were needed in the north. By the beginning of 1942, with the help of Estonian and Latvian railway personnel, it was still possible to send supplies from Germany all the way to the Leningrad front. The Eisenbahnpionier or Eisenbahntruppen (railway engineers) were the sections dealing with engineer combat equipment, repair of tracks, bridging, and other river-crossing materials. They often used prisoners of war labor. Two Eisenbahnpionier battalions per army group were allocated to convert their main lines. It was estimated that each Army Group would need 25 trains of supplies per day (11,250t/day), traveling at an average speed of 55 km/h, to be able to perform their duties and to maintain minimum capabilities. However, due to the severe winter conditions, in January-February 1942, Army Group North could only receive 10 trains per day.
Trains had always been a traditional means of transport in Russia. In early 1941, the majority of the Soviet rail line network was the same as it had been at the end of WW1, with its highest density of rail in the west. Four major east-west running trunk lines connected the western border regions of the Soviet Union (including the recently annexed regions) with Soviet rear areas. From north to south, the first line connected the Niemen River to Leningrad, the Bug River to Orsha to Moscow, the Bug River to Kremenchug to the Donets Basin, and the San River to Odessa. The Donets industrial region, Leningrad, and Moscow were the three important urban and industrial centers. The only line with a bed of crushed-rock ballast was the Moscow-Kharkov line. All the others used sand and gravel beds. The Soviet railway system was a fundamentally different instrument.
For the Soviets, the railway system also played a vital role in their war effort, being the main means of mode of transport for long-distance transport, bringing in new divisions, equipment, supplies, and freight to the front lines and often evacuating entire factories and towns from European Russia to the Ural region and Siberia. During Operation Barbarossa, the Red Army and Soviet railways (NKPS) managed to withdraw or destroy the majority of its rolling stock, bridges, water towers, and repair workshops during its retreat. The main burden of the evacuation carried out in the first months of the war was also assumed by the railways, amounting to more than 1.5 million wagons, or 30,000 trains. Almost half of the country's wagon fleet was evacuated. The People's Commissariat of Railways employed around four million workers during the war, plus 30 brigades of railway troops tasked to work on reconstruction.
As a result, German standard gauge rolling stock had to be used for an additional logistic role within Russia. This required the laying of standard gauge track (from Russian 1524 mm to European 1435 mm). The Reichsbahn railway staff and the railway troops of the Wehrmacht had to convert a total of 16,148 km of Soviet tracks to German standard gauge track between 22 June and 8 October 1941. Eisenbahn battalions managed to regauge on average 25km per day. When a railway had wooden sleepers, it was fairly easy to make the gauge narrower by removing the nails and placing them back at a narrower position. In Lithuania and Latvia, German railway workers were fortunate to find that some of the tracks had not been yet converted to the Russian broad gauge. A huge effort was devoted to rail repair and regauging. The 231 captured Soviet locomotives however, could not be converted, and thus were given to Finland. Additional depots had to be build, on average one between two already existing ones. From December 1941 to the end of 1943, the Soviets had to rely on the railroads left east of Moscow.
By January 1943, the Germans controlled 35,000 km of the former Soviet network. At its peak, in the summer of 1943, every important rail line in the German-occupied Soviet Union had been converted to the standard gauge. Every day, over 200 trains departed from the Reich territories for the Eastern Front. The Soviet partisans tried to wreak maximum disruption on the German rear area rail system. For example, during the month of June 1943, there were over 840 partisan attacks recorded against German rail lines in the sector controlled by Army Group Center alone. Surprise raids were conducted against supply dumps, bridges, and railroad infrastructures. Trains were destroyed by exploding the roadbed or removing track. Troops trying to escape from trucks or trains were taken under fire.
During the game you will use two kinds of transport vehicles: trains and trucks. What do they depict?
KRIEGSLOKOMOTIVEN: “WAR LOCOMOTIVES” OF THE DEUTSCHE REICHSBAHN FROM 1939
Since the 1850s, the railroad had gained enormous strategic importance. In both World Wars, Germany put the Reichsbahn at the service of the war machine to the limits of the resilience of both the material and the humans operating it. At its peak, the Deutsche Reichsbahn, one of the largest organizations of the Third Reich, had approximately 1.4 million German personnel. Mobilization of the German railroad industry occurred in conjunction with mobilization for war. As the Germans occupied one nation after another, locals were also pressed into service as auxiliary railway personnel in their respective nations. During wartime, the Deutsche Reichsbahn adhered to military regulations and was placed under the guidance of the German Army General Staff's Transportation Division. Wehrmacht trains traveled under secret coded trip numbers indicating the nature of the movement, the origin, and destination of the train. Due to the huge distances involved, railway transportation system played a far more strategic role on the Eastern Front than any other war theater.
From 1937, the DRB class 50 standard locomotive was developed to replace the aging Prussian G 10 freight models. From April to July 1939, the first 12 class 50 trains were delivered by Henschel & Sohn. The beginning of WW2 increased the demand for freight locomotives so that they were built in large numbers: 3,164 of the 80 km/h locomotives were built between 1939 and 1948. The “Kriegslokomotiven” are all the locomotives built after the beginning of the war in 1939. The DRB class 50 had a tractive effort of 1,625 hp. With the invasion of the Soviet Union, the demands on the railways reached crippling proportions, culminating in the coal shortage during the winter of 1941-1942. At the time, between 70-80% of all German locomotives deployed on the Eastern Front became inoperable. Provisional war locomotives were needed in order to cope with the huge demand of the standard locomotive classes 44, 50, and 86. Equipment not essential for the operation of the locomotives was left out; they were built using home-produced materials. Every attempt was being made to economize labor and speed up production! They were given the designation “ÜK” (Übergangskriegslokomotiven) after the class number.
These austerity variants led in 1942 to the new Kriegslokomotive class 52 which was designed by Richard Paul Wagner’s team of engineers. The class 52 were powerful, yet simpler and sturdier machines. To simplify construction work and maintenance, every item not essential to running the locomotive was streamed down and eliminated. Having ten driving wheels, with an overall tractive power of around 1,598 hp, these locomotives were the answer for much of Germany's transport difficulties to supply the Eastern Front. As for the production, German locomotive manufacturers were merged into the Gemeinschaft Grossdeutscher Lokomotivhersteller (GGL), which was a subdivision of the Hauptausschuss Schienenfahrzeuge (HAS), founded in 1942. Kriegslocomotiven output continued at a high level after the winter of 1941-42, reaching a peak in September 1943. Allied aerial attacks on locomotive plants were the main reasons for the decline inproduction after that date. The class 52 were built in Germany, Austria, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Between 1942 and the end of the war in May 1945, over 7,000 class 52 locomotives were built. The last class 50s were only retired in 1987.
THE OPEL BLITZ TRUCK
Starting in 1930, Opel successfully built light trucks in Rüsselsheim with payloads of up to 3-t under the popular "Opel Blitz" brand. Opel became the largest manufacturer of trucks in Germany. The year after Hitler took office, their production numbers rose rapidly due to the German rearmament. More than 130,000 Blitz trucks and chassis were produced until the end of the war.
After the beginning of WW2, the 3-t Blitz 3.6-36 S became the most widely used truck in the Wehrmacht, the backbone of the Blitzkrieg, with civilian vehicles also being requisitioned. From Blitz 3.6 came variants such as the 4x4 chassis Blitz A, and the half-track Maultier (“the mule”) SdKfz 3 v, designed specially for the Eastern Front, for use during the muddy conditions of the rasputitsa. Its top speed was 80 km/h on roads. Operational range was around 410 km, which was critical to maintaining the divisions as they advanced on the Eastern Front. Many other variants and field adaptations existed, some vehicles carrying machine guns such as the MG 42, others mounting 37mm to 20 mm autocannons. The 3-t class could also be adapted as an ambulance, a personnel carrier, a command vehicle… etc.
The Blitz 3.5 / 3.6 were manufactured at Opelwerk Brandenburg on the Havel. The factory, which was built in 1935 by Adam Opel AG specifically for the truck production, reached a peak production of 2,600 units in July 1944. The factory was led by Gerd Stieler von Heydekampf from 1938 to 1942. On August 6 1944, the factory was partly destroyed by a Royal Air Force raid: half of the factory buildings were destroyed along with 20% of the machines. The truck production came to a standstill and never resumed.
Written by Dr. Eric G. L. Pinzelli
Thanks for reading! We hope that this info gave you a perspective of the struggle that awaits you in 1941. Race to Moscow!
Happy gaming!
Michał & PHALANX Team
The Rulebook
over 4 years ago
– Wed, Dec 04, 2019 at 10:43:04 PM
Hello Everyone,
Today we are happy to present you the beta version of the Rulebook. It still needs a lot of polishing, but it is good enough to give you a first look at rules composition. Please note that it may not contain the content unlocked during this campaign, as we do not know what goals we will achieve. :)
Your comments and feedback will be much appreciated here. Please post them in comments under this update. Thank you!
Please remember that we are waiting for your votes in the new poll. As we are approaching the end of the campaign, every vote is important!
Please also remember to share the news about this campaign in your social media gaming groups - the more people we have, the better game you will get! :) Here are the posts that you can use for this:
Twenty pages of rules is a nice amount for an afternoon read, but it doesn’t mean that we will resign from today’s historical capsule! So, let’s continue the leadership topic form yesterday:
GERMAN PANZER GROUPS AND THEIR GENERALS
“It was principally the books and articles of the Englishmen, Fuller, Liddell Hart and Martel, that excited my interest and gave me food for thought. These far-sighted soldiers were even then trying to make the tank more than just an infantry support weapon. They envisaged it in relationship to the growing motorization of our age, and thus they became pioneers of a new type of warfare on the largest scale.” - Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader, 1952 (1st English Edition).
In reality, in his writings prior to WW2, Guderian only mentioned the works of Fuller and Charles de Gaulle although these foreign authors were not part of the compulsory studies for German officers. In fact, in the general section were works from Clausewitz, Schlieffen, and Waldemar Erfurth, while the technical section contained works on armor, including Guderian's Achtung-Panzer! and Walter Nehring's Panzerabwehr. The story of interwar Geman tank development is the study of the development of Guderian's ideas on armored warfare. For Heinz Guderian, speed was the essence of armored warfare. Victory was possible only through the surprise and shock that resulted from the maximum utilization of the tank's inherent speed. The operational potential of such combined arms formations was realized in 1935 with the creation of the first three Panzer armored divisions. General Oswald Lutz, another fine armored theorist, commanded the Armored Troops Command at the time. Other prominent German theorists included Fritz Heigl and Ernst Volckheim.
Guderian was selected to be one of the first commanders. These armored divisions represented the realization of Heinz Guderian's theories. Thus, in October 1935, the Wehrmacht organized its first three Panzer Divisions: the 1st under General Maximilian Freiherr von Weichs; the 2nd was led by Guderian; and the 3rd by General Ernst Fessmann. Originally, each division consisted of two panzer regiments organized into a brigade, a motorized infantry brigade, a reconnaissance battalion, a divisional artillery regiment, and supporting ancillary formations. Counting command tanks, the division had some 561 tanks in all. The new Panzer division was a model of flexibility: it could attack and defend, penetrate, and pursue, and its integral radio command allowed it to turn on a dime, providing an agility that was atypical of other military formations of the day.
1st PANZER GROUP
When originally formed on 1 March 1940, the 1st Panzer Army was named “Panzer Group Kleist” (Panzergruppe Kleist) with Colonel General Ewald von Kleist in command. Paul Ludwig von Kleist was born on August 8, 1881 at B*raunfels in Hesse. He served as a lieutenant of hussars and a regimental commander in WW1. After the war, he served in various high staff appointments before being retired in 1938. He was recalled to service at the beginning of WW2 and was put in command of an army corps. A master of blitzkrieg, Kleist participated in the German invasion of Poland (1939) at the head of the XXII Motorized Corps, and commanded the Panzer Group that broke through the Ardennes Forest during the Campaign of France. In the spring of 1941, his Corps (renamed the 1st Panzer Group) took Belgrade during the Yugoslavian campaign. Early in the invasion of the Soviet Union, his Panzer Group led the attack on Kiev and the advance through the Ukraine. In November 1941, Kleist’s troops captured Rostov, only to lose it a week later when the Soviet Marshal Timoshenko launched a counteroffensive. When the Germans renewed their offensive in the summer of 1942, Kleist’s 1st Panzer Group drove through to the foothills of the Caucasus but then had to retreat, narrowly escaping encirclement. Kleist was promoted to the rank of field marshal in 1943 but was dismissed from his command by Hitler in March 1944. In April 1945, he was captured by U.S. troops. He was extradited to Yugoslavia, where in 1948 he was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment. Extradited to the Soviet Union, he was charged with war crimes, and died at the Vladimir Central Prison on November 13, 1954, at age 73.
2nd PANZER GROUP
The 2nd Panzer Group (Panzergruppe 2) was formed in November 1940 from Panzer Group Guderian. In October 1941, it was renamed the 2nd Panzer Army. Colonel General Heinz Wilhelm Guderian (1888-1954) was born June 17, 1888 at Kulm in West Prussia. He was the son of a Prussian Lieutenant General. In 1901, he enrolled in a military cadet school at Karlsruhe. During WW1, Guderian participated in the Battles of the Marne and Verdun. At the end of the war, he was on the General Staff of the High Command. After the war, Guderian remained in the army and became interested in armored warfare. Attracting Hitler’s attention in 1935, he rose rapidly and was able to put many of his revolutionary ideas into practice. His Achtung! Panzer! (1937) incorporated many of the theories of British general John Fuller and French General Charles de Gaulle, who advocated the creation of independent armored formations with strong air and motorized infantry support, intended to increase mobility on the battlefield by quick penetrations of enemy lines and by trapping vast bodies of men and weapons in encircling movements. Guderian also developed a radio-communication system that enabled communication between tank officers. Consequently, the German army, despite opposition from conservative elements, developed a tactical superiority at the outbreak of WW2 that repeatedly ensured victory. Guderian led the attack on Poland in September 1939, won the battle of Brest-Litovsk in September with his XIXth Panzer Corps. His lightning success created shock-waves throughout the world. Guderian was awarded the Ritterkreuz by Hitler for his achievements in Poland. During the Campaign of France, he spearheaded the drive to the French coast of the English Channel (May 1940) that took France out of the war. After the campaign, Guderian was promoted to the rank of colonel general. During Operation Barbarossa, Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group took Minsk and Smolensk. In July 1941, he moved into the Ukraine where he captured Kiev, before moving on Moscow. Incurring Hitler’s disfavor for withdrawing his troops in the face of a Russian counteroffensive during the winter of 1941–42, he was dismissed, in December 1941, but he returned in March 1943 as inspector general of armored troops, a position created especially for him, with authority to establish priorities in the production of armored vehicles as well as to direct their employment. Working closely with Albert Speer, Guderian was responsible for tank design, their production and upgrades, the training of the crews, and their tactical deployment. After the July 20, 1944, attempt on Hitler’s life, Guderian became acting chief of staff, replacing General Kurt Zeitzler. On 28 March, following the failed operation to retake the town of Küstrin, Guderian was sent on leave. Guderian and his staff surrendered to US forces on 10 May 1945. Despite claims in the Soviet Union and Poland that Guderian was a war criminal, he was released from captivity on 17th June 1948. Heinz Guderian died at Goslar on 17th May 1954, aged 65. Guderian is considered to be one of the founding fathers of “blitzkrieg” warfare.
3rd PANZER GROUP
The 3rd Panzer Group (Panzergruppe 3) was formed on 16 November 1940. Its commander was Colonel General Hermann Hoth who led 3rd Panzer Group in Army Group Center—in tandem with Guderian’s 2nd Group—during the invasion of the Soviet Union. Together those two daring panzer commanders achieved a series of astounding victories, encircling entire Russian armies at Minsk, Smolensk, and Vyazma, all the way up to the very gates of Moscow. Colonel General Hermann Hoth (1885-1971), the son of a Prussian army medical officer, was born in Neuruppen, on 12th April 1891. In 1896, he joined the Prussian Cadet Corps in Potsdam, and in 1904 he began his service in the 4th Thuringian Infantry Regiment. He served throughout WW1. By the end of the war, he was First General Staff Officer of the 30th Infantry Division. Hoth remained in the army after the war and in 1935 was given command of Germany's 18th Division at Liegnitz. Promoted to lieutenant general he was appointed head of 15th Motorized Corps on 10th November, 1938 and the following year took part in the invasion of Poland. During the 1940 Western Offensive, Hoth drove through the Ardennes to the Channel, before entering Normandy and Brittany. His success resulted in him being promoted to colonel general on 19th July 1940. Hoth was head of 3rd Panzer Group during Operation Barbarossa. His troops captured Minsk and Vitebsk before heading for Moscow. In October, 1941, Hoth was sent to command the 17th Army in the Ukraine. The Red Army counterattacked in January 1942, and Hoth was driven back. In June 1942, Hoth succeeded Erich Hoepner as head of the 4th Panzer Army and was involved in the siege of Stalingrad. He also took part in the Battle of Kursk in July 1943, but was forced to withdraw to better defensive positions. Hitler recalled Hoth to Germany in December 1943, and for the rest of the war he was part of the reserve. After the war, Hoth was arrested and charged with war crimes at High Command Trial in Nuremberg. He was sentenced on 27th October 1948 to 15 years in prison but was released after six years. Hermann Hoth died at Goslar in 1971, aged 85.
4th PANZER GROUP
Colonel General Erich Hoepner was appointed to command the 4th Panzer Group (Panzergruppe 4) in February 1941. Erich Hoepner (1886 – 1944), was born in Frankfurt, and began his military training in Metz (Lorraine) in 1905. He served in the cavalry on the Western Front during WW1. After the war, Hoepner remained in the army, and by 1938 had reached the rank of Major General. As the head of the 1st Light Division, he took part in the occupation of Czechoslovakia and the invasion of Poland. In March 1939 Hoepner succeeded Heinz Guderian as head of the 16th Army Corps, leading his troops in the Campaign of France.
At the outset of Operation Barbarossa, he commanded the 4th Panzer Army. His troops attacked Leningrad before being transferred to Army Group Center, where he fought under General Field Marshal Günther von Kluge. In January 1942, Hoepner ignored Hitler's command to hold out before Moscow, and withdrew his troops. He was immediately removed from his post, and expelled from the Wehrmacht on the same day. Hoepner filed a lawsuit against the Reich to reclaim his pension and had it restored. Hoepner was deeply involved in the July 20, 1944 plot against Hitler. After the coup failed, Hoepner was sentenced to death by the "People's Court" on August 8, 1944 and hanged. His close family also suffered from retaliation.
Written by Dr. Eric G. L. Pinzelli
Happy gaming!
Michał & PHALANX Team
Pax Unplugged (and the fourth poll!)
over 4 years ago
– Tue, Dec 03, 2019 at 08:37:54 PM
The game will be set up in the First Look section:
In zone 5:
It will be available all day, every day from 10:00-24:00 Dec 6-8 with at least one person available to teach it. If you are going to visit PAX, please reserve an hour for a 1941. Race to Moscow demo! Thank you!
The Fourth Poll
We are close to funding the Logistic Cards game variant, so it is time for a new poll, to let you decide what stretch goal will follow. Here is the link to the poll:
Thank you very much for your tremendous support in creating the final content of this game. Again, you are building with us a leading project in Kickstarter’s wargames category. We really appreciate this!
And speaking about leading...
German Army Group Commanders
ARMY GROUP NORTH
Army Group North, aiming at the Baltic States and Leningrad, was commanded by Generalfeldmarschall Ritter von Leeb. Although it was the smallest and weakest of the three Army Groups (with only 49 divisions), it managed to smash through the Dvina Line, then the Stalin Line, flood into Latvia, and pressed on to encircle Leningrad. Von Leeb’s subordinates were General Georg von Küchler at the head of the 18th Army, who was to attack through Estonia, Colonel General Erich Hoepner leading 4th Panzer Group, who would pierce Soviet defenses and aim directly at Leningrad, and General Ernst Busch, at the head of the 16th Army, that would follow 4th Panzer Group.
Field Marshal Ritter von Leeb (1876 –1956): Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb was born on September 5th 1876. At age 19, he joined the Bavarian Army and served in China during the Boxer Rebellion. In 1897, he joined the 4th Field Artillery Regiment and fought in WW1 as an artillery officer. Leeb remained in the army after the Great War. In 1934, Leeb was appointed commander of the 2nd Army Group Headquarters. When WW2 started in September 1939, Leeb was given command of Army Group C, tasked with defending Germany from a French invasion while much the Wehrmacht's forces were directed against Poland. During the Campaign of France in May 1940, Leeb’s army group played a major part in defeating the defenders who were based in the Maginot Line. Leeb was promoted to field marshal on July 19th 1940. As part of Operation Barbarossa, Leeb was given the command of Army Group North. After a month, the Germans managed to penetrate the Stalin Line on the former Latvian-Russian border. The road to Leningrad lay wide open but the Soviets had re-reinforcements move in. The tenacious resistance by the Soviets, the long lines of supply, the shortage of men, and the difficult terrain worked against Von Leeb. In early 1942, Von Leeb decided the situation of his troops was dangerous and he ordered a tactical withdrawal, without authorization from OKH, in order to shorten the frontline, thereby making it more defensible. When Hitler heard about this, a conflict erupted between the Führer and the field marshal. Leeb resigned from his command on January 15th 1942 and was placed on the retired list on January 18th. After the war, he was tried by the US Military at Nuremberg and sentenced to three years imprisonment before being released. Leeb died at Füssen in 1956, aged 79.
Field marshal Georg von Küchler (1881 – 1968): Georg von Küchler was born at Hanau in Prussia on 30th April, 1881. During WW1, he commanded an artillery battery on the Western Front and took part in the battles of Verdun and the Somme. In 1916 he became staff officer of the 206th Infantry Division. After the war, Küchler joined the Freikorps and fought against the Red Army in Poland. Promoted to colonel, Küchler became Deputy Commander of the 1st Infantry Division in East Prussia in 1932. In March 1939, he joined with Heinrich Himmler in the occupation of the Lithuanian territory of Memel. During the invasion of Poland, Küchler's 3rd Army captured Danzig. In the 1940 Western Offensive, he fought under General Fedor von Bock and commanded the troops that invaded the Netherlands. He took Moerdijk, Rotterdam, and the Hague before moving into Belgium, and occupied Antwerp on 18th May, 1940. On July 4, 1940, Küchler and Major General Erich Marcks were tasked to plan Operation Barbarossa. During the subsequent invasion of the Soviet Union, Küchler led his 18th Army. In January 1942, Küchler replaced Wilhelm Leeb as commander of Army Group North and he was elevated to the rank of field marshal. Küchler commanded Army Group North from December 1941 through January 1944, maintaining the siege of Leningrad, until he ordered a withdrawal to the Luga River. Hitler then replaced him with General Walther Model. Küchler was found guilty of war crimes at Nuremberg, and on 27th October 1948 he was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment for his treatment of partisans and the execution of political commissars in the Soviet Union. Küchler was released in February 1955 and died at Garmisch-Partenkirchen, on 25th May 1968.
Colonel general Erich Hoepner (1886 – 1944): Erich Hoepner was born in Frankfurt, and began his military training in Metz (Lorraine) in 1905. He served in the cavalry on the Western Front during WW1. After the war, Hoepner remained in the army, and by 1938 had reached the rank of Major General. As the head of the 1st Light Division, he took part in the occupation of Czechoslovakia and the invasion of Poland. In March 1939, Hoepner succeeded Heinz Guderian as head of the 16th Army Corps, leading his troops in the Campaign of France. At the outset of Operation Barbarossa, he commanded the 4th Panzer Army. His troops attacked Leningrad before being transferred to Army Group Center, where he fought under general field marshal Günther von Kluge. In January 1942, Hoepner ignored Hitler's command to hold out before Moscow and withdrew his troops. He was immediately removed from his post and expelled from the Wehrmacht on the same day. Hoepner filed a lawsuit against the Reich to reclaim his pension and had it restored. Hoepner was deeply involved in the July 20, 1944 plot against Hitler. After the coup failed, Hoepner was sentenced to death by the "People's Court" on August 8, 1944 and hanged. His close family also suffered from retaliation.
Field marshal Ernst Busch (1885 –1945): Ernst Busch was born in Essen, Germany, on 6th July, 1885. He joined the German Army in 1904, and during WW1 he served on the Western Front where he participated in every battle from Liège (August 1914) to the 1918 German Spring Offensive. He was wounded three times. In 1918, he was awarded the Pour le Mérite. Busch remained in the army after the war. In 1930 he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel and placed in command of the 9th Infantry Regiment. After Adolf Hitler came to power in 1933, he was promoted to major general, and in February 1938 Hitler appointed him general. Busch served under Siegmund List during the invasion of Poland in September 1939. The following year, he led the 16th Army during the 1940 Western Offensive. During Operation Barbarossa, his 16th Army took Demyansk on September 1941, before taking part in the siege of Leningrad. Despite a counterattack by the Red Army in early 1942, Busch's troops held the line from Staraya to Ostashkov. On 1st February 1943 he was promoted to field marshal. In October of the same year, Busch replaced General Gunther von Kluge as head of Army Group Center until he when he was replaced by General Walther Model in June of 1944. In March 1945, he became the head of Army Group Northwest. Along with Kurt Student and his 1st Parachute Army, Busch had the task of stopping the advance of General Bernard Montgomery and the Allies into Germany. Ernst Busch surrendered on May 4th, 1945. He died in captivity in Britain on 17th July 1945.
ARMY GROUP CENTER
Army Group Center, led by Field Marshal Fedor von Bock, was tasked to take the route north of the Pripyat Marshes, heading to Moscow. Von Bock had 57 divisions under his command, including 9 armored divisions. His subordinates were Colonel General Hermann Hoth, leader of the 3rd Panzer Group, who was the northern arm of the giant pincers, general Adolf Strauss, with the 9th Army, that would push in the direction of Polotsk and Vitebsk, Field Marshal Günther von Kluge that would follow 2nd Panzer Group with the 4th Army, and Colonel General Heinz Guderian, leading the thrust of the southern arm of the pincers with his 2nd Panzer Group.
Field Marshal Fedor von Bock (1880-1945) was born on December 3, 1880 at Küstrin (now Kostrzyn, Poland). Originating from an old Prussian family, he was educated at the Potsdam military school. During WW1, he fought on the Western Front and the Eastern Front throughout the war, being awarded the Pour le Mérite on 1st April 1918. After the war, he became commander of the 3rd Army group in 1920, and remained in that post until 1938, when he was made commander of the 1st Army group. During the Campaign of France in May-June 1940, he commanded the lower Somme army group. He was one of the 12 German generals whom Hitler made field marshals of the Reich on July 19, 1940. His belief that the greatest ambition of a German youth was to die in the service of the Fatherland earned him the nickname "the Holy Fire of Küstrin." In 1941, Bock took command of Army Group Center at the outset of Operation Barbarossa. He dealt the Russians some of their severest defeats in the early part of the campaign, notably at Bialystok and Minsk and later at Smolensk and Vyazma. He unleashed six separate major offensives against Moscow in the fall of 1941 but failed to take the city. Then Bock began his series of “orderly retreats” and “defensive actions.” He was later shifted to Army Group South and led the attack on Stalingrad in the 1942 German summer offensive. He was relieved of his command in July when he complained of the strategic impracticality of operating massive German offensives simultaneously against Stalingrad and in the Caucasus. He never again occupied a senior command position. On 3 May 1945, next to Lensahn, Bock was killed along with his wife and daughter, when a British fighter aircraft strafed his vehicle. He was the highest ranking German officer to be killed by direct enemy action in WW2.
Colonel general Hermann Hoth (1885-1971). Hermann Hoth, the son of a Prussian army medical officer, was born in Neuruppen, on 12th April 1891. In 1896, he joined the Prussian Cadet Corps in Potsdam, and in 1904 he began his service in the 4th Thuringian Infantry Regiment. He served throughout WW1. By the end of the war, he was First General Staff Officer of the 30th Infantry Division. Hoth remained in the army after the war and in 1935 was given command of Germany's 18th Division at Liegnitz. Promoted to lieutenant general he was appointed head of 15th Motorized Corps on 10th November, 1938 and the following year took part in the invasion of Poland. During the 1940 Western Offensive, Hoth drove through the Ardennes to the Channel before entering Normandy and Brittany. His success resulted in him being promoted to colonel general on 19th July 1940. Hoth was head of the 3rd Panzer Group during Operation Barbarossa. His troops captured Minsk and Vitebsk before heading for Moscow. In October, 1941, Hoth was sent to command the 17th Army in the Ukraine. The Red Army counterattacked in January 1942, and Hoth was driven back. In June 1942, Hoth succeeded Erich Hoepner as head of the 4th Panzer Army and was involved in the siege of Stalingrad. He also took part in the Battle of Kursk in July 1943, but was forced to withdraw to better defensive positions. Hitler recalled Hoth to Germany in December 1943, and for the rest of the war he was part of the reserve. After the war, Hoth was arrested and charged with war crimes at High Command Trial in Nuremberg. He was sentenced on 27th October 1948 to 15 years in prison but was released after six years. Hermann Hoth died at Goslar in 1971, aged 85.
Colonel General Adolf Strauss (1879-1973). Another Prussian officer, Strauss joined the army in 1898 in the 137th Infantry Regiment. He fought during the entirety of WW1, and by the end of the war he was the commander of the 99th Infantry Regiment of the Upper Rhine. After the war, he served as professor of the infantry school at Dresden. From September 1934, Strauss worked in the Reich Ministry of Defense in Berlin as inspector of the infantry. As commander of the 2nd Army Corps, Strauss participated in the Invasion of Poland. During the Campaign of France on 30 May 1940, he was appointed commander of the 9th Army. Strauss participated in Operation Barbarossa with Army Group Center at the head of the same army. In January 1942, he was replaced in command of the 9th Army by divisional commander Walter Model for health reasons. After his recovery, he was transferred to the Führerreserve, but was recalled as commander of the East fortress area in January 1945. From May 1945 to May 1948, Strauss was a prisoner of war in Britain. He died at Lübeck on 20 March 1973, aged 93.
Field Marshal Günther von Kluge (1882-1944) was born October 30, 1882 at Posen. Originating from an old Prussian aristocratic family, Kluge served in WW1 and afterward remained in the army. During WW2, he successfully led the 4th Army in the Polish and French campaigns. For his entrapment of Polish forces in the early stages of the invasion, Kluge earned Hitler's praise as one of his most brilliant commanders. Kluge's astute command throughout the invasion of France led to his promotion to field marshal on 19 July 1940. As commander of Army Group Center in the Soviet Union from December 1941 (replacing Fedor von Bock) until he was wounded in a car accident in October 1943, he was largely successful in containing the Soviet offensives against his forces. Ernst Busch replaced Kluge as commander of Army Group Center. On July 3, 1944, after the Normandy landings, Hitler replaced Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, the German commander in chief in the west, with Kluge. However, his career in command of the Western Front was to be short‐lived: Within two months of his appointment, he was relieved from this position by Hitler himself. Kluge was no more able to stop the Anglo-American advance than Rundstedt had been, and the German forces in Normandy were soon almost completely encircled. Kluge was remotely involved in the assassination attempt of July 20, 1944. His name appeared in several incriminating papers and Hitler, suspecting him of complicity, and possibly even of making contact with Allied commanders, dismissed him on August 17 and replaced by Walter Model. Anticipating arrest, two days later Kluge committed suicide using potassium cyanide.
Colonel General Heinz Guderian (1888-1954). Heinz Wilhelm Guderian was born June 17, 1888 at Kulm, in West Prussia. He was the son of a Prussian Lieutenant General. In 1901, he enrolled in a military cadet school at Karlsruhe. During WW1, Guderian participated, among others, in the Battle of the Marne and the Battle of Verdun. At the end of the war, he was on the General Staff of the High Command. After the war, Guderian remained in the army and became interested in armored warfare. Attracting Hitler’s attention in 1935, he rose rapidly and was able to put many of his revolutionary ideas into practice. His Achtung! Panzer! (1937) incorporated many of the theories of British general John Fuller and French General Charles de Gaulle, who advocated the creation of independent armored formations with strong air and motorized infantry support, intended to increase mobility on the battlefield by quick penetrations of enemy lines and by trapping vast bodies of men and weapons in encircling movements. Guderian also developed a radio communication system that enabled communication between tank officers. Consequently, the German army, despite opposition from conservative elements, developed a tactical superiority at the outbreak of WW2 that repeatedly ensured victory. Guderian led the attack on Poland in September 1939, won the battle of Brest-Litovsk in September with his XIXth Panzer Corps. His lightning success created shockwaves throughout the world. Guderian was awarded the Ritterkreuz by Hitler for his achievements in Poland. During the Campaign of France, he spearheaded the drive to the French coast of the English Channel (May 1940) that took France out of the war. After the campaign, Guderian was promoted to the rank of colonel general. During Operation Barbarossa, Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group took Minsk and Smolensk. In July 1941, he moved into the Ukraine where he captured Kiev, before moving on Moscow. Incurring Hitler’s disfavor for withdrawing his troops in the face of a Russian counter offensive during the winter of 1941–42, he was dismissed in December 1941, but he returned in March 1943 as inspector general of armored troops, a position created especially for him, with authority to establish priorities in the production of armored vehicles as well as to direct their employment. Working closely with Albert Speer, Guderian was responsible for tank design, their production and upgrades, the training of the crews, and their tactical deployment. After the July 20 1944, attempt on Hitler’s life, Guderian became acting chief of staff, replacing General Kurt Zeitzler. On 28 March, following the failed operation to retake the town of Küstrin, Guderian was sent on leave. Guderian and his staff surrendered to US forces on 10 May 1945. Despite claims in the Soviet Union and Poland that Guderian was a war criminal, he was released from captivity on 17th June 1948. Heinz Guderian died at Goslar on 17th May 1954, aged 65. Guderian is considered to be one of the founding fathers of “blitzkrieg” warfare.
ARMY GROUP SOUTH
Army Group South’s overall command was entrusted to Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, whose main task was to take Ukraine and its capital Kiev. Army Group South received 43 German plus 14 Romanian divisions, including five armored divisions. After the beginning of Operation Barbarossa, Army Group South was reinforced by a gradually increasing number of Hungarian, Slovak, and Italian divisions. Von Rundstedt’s subordinates were Colonel General Ewald von Kleist, heading the 1st Panzer Group, who was to perform an encirclement maneuver toward Kiev, Field Marshal Walter von Reichenau, leading the 6th Army, was to push north of Kiev and follow 1st Panzer Group, General of the Infantry Karl Heinrich von Stuelpnagel, at the head of the 7th Army, was to attack in the direction of Vinnitsa, and Colonel Ceneral Eugen von Schobert, with the 11th Army, was to push in the direction of the lower Dnieper.
Field Marshal Karl Rudolf Gerd von Rundstedt, who was from an old Junker family, was born December 12, 1875 and joined the army in 1893. Rundstedt rose during WW1 to become chief of staff of an army corps and assisted in the reorganization of the Turkish general staff. He remained in the army after the war and was active in Germany’s secret rearmament both before and after Hitler came to power. He retired in 1938 as senior field commander but returned to active duty to command an army group in the Polish campaign at the outbreak of WW2. Later, on the Western Front, he took part in the implementation of the plan that defeated France in 1940; as head of Army Group B, he led the breakthrough that sealed France’s fate. He was, however, partly to blame for the order to halt the German armour, allowing most of the B.E.F to escape from Dunkirk. After the Campaign of France, Von Rundstedt was promoted to field marshal on July 19, 1940. During Operation Barbarossa, he commanded Army Group South, which overran almost all of Ukraine before the winter of 1941. Von Rundstedt's forces succeeded in capturing Kharkov in late October and Rostov in late November. When a Soviet counteroffensive forced a retreat, Hitler dismissed the aged field marshal who had him replaced by field marshal Walther von Reichenau. In July 1942, Rundstedt became commander in chief in western Europe and fortified France against an expected Allied invasion. After the Allied landings in Normandy, with the failure of a German counterattack at Caen on July 1, he was asked by Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel what should be done. To this he replied: "Make peace you fools! What else can you do?" He was removed from command and replaced with Field Marshal Gunther von Kluge. From September 1944, he directed the Ardennes offensive, the last major German offensive in the West. Relieved of his command for the third time in March 1945, he was captured by U.S. troops in May, then handed over to British custody. Von Rundstedt was released in 1949 because of ill health. He died at Hannover on 24 February 1953.
Colonel General Paul Ludwig von Kleist was born on August 8, 1881, at Braunfels in Hesse. He served as a lieutenant of hussars and a regimental commander in WW1. After the war, he served in various high staff appointments before being retired in 1938. He was recalled to service at the beginning of WW2 and was put in command of an army corps. A master of blitzkrieg, Kleist participated in the German invasion of Poland (1939) at the head of the XXII Motorized Corps, and commanded the Panzer Group that broke through the Ardennes Forest during the Campaign of France. In the spring of 1941, his corps, renamed 1st Panzer Group, took Belgrade during the Yugoslavian campaign. Early in the invasion of the Soviet Union, his Panzer Group led the attack on Kiev and the advance through the Ukraine. In November 1941, Kleist’s troops captured Rostov, only to lose it a week later when the Soviet Marshal Timoshenko launched a counteroffensive. When the Germans renewed their offensive in the summer of 1942, Kleist’s 1st Panzer Group drove through to the foothills of the Caucasus but then had to retreat, narrowly escaping encirclement. Kleist was promoted to the rank of field marshal in 1943 but was dismissed from his command by Hitler in March 1944. In April 1945, he was captured by U.S. troops. He was extradited to Yugoslavia, where in 1948 he was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment. Extradited to the Soviet Union, he was charged with war crimes, and died at the Vladimir Central Prison on November 13, 1954, at age 73.
Field Marshal Walther von Reichenau, who was the son of a general of the artillery, was born on 8 October 1884 at Karlsruhe. He joined the army as an artillery cadet in 1903 and served on the German general staff during WW1. He was raised to the rank of lieutenant general during the Polish campaign in 1939 and was made a field marshal in July 1940 in recognition of his generalship during the Campaign of France. Marshal von Reichenau was in command of the German army that scored initial successes against Marshal Budenny’s Soviet forces in the Ukraine campaign in the fall of 1941. On October 10 1941, Von Reichenau issued his infamous “Severity Order” which paved the way for mass murder of Jews. In November, Von Reichenau took command of Army Group South, replacing von Rundstedt. On 14 January 1942, Reichenau suffered from a severe stroke after a run in the forest in subzero temperatures (-40 degrees). The flight carrying his body crashed while landing in Lemberg (Ukraine). He had a state funeral and was buried at the Invalids' Cemetery in Berlin.
General of the Infantry Carl-Heinrich Rudolf Wilhelm von Stülpnagel was born in Berlin on January 2, 1886 to a noble family. He joined the Prussian army in 1904 and served as a staff officer during WW1. On October 6, 1936, he became commander of the newly established 30th Infantry Division in Lübeck. From November 1938 to May 1940 he served as deputy chief of staff to Franz Halder, head of the OKH. On April 20 1939, von Stülpnagel was promoted to General of the Infantry. After the launch of Operation Barbarossa, he successfully led the 17th Army across southern Russia, achieving victory at the battles of Uman and Kiev. Stülpnagel was involved in the conspiracy of the officers against Adolf Hitler on July 20, 1944. He succeeded in arresting in Paris the most important officials and leaders of the Schutzstaffel, the security service of the Reichsführer SS, and the Secret State Police. After the failure of the plot, he was recalled to Berlin and attempted to commit suicide, but failed to kill himself. Tried on 30 August 1944, he was convicted of treason and hanged at Plötzensee.
Colonel General Eugen Siegfried Erich Ritter von Schobert was born at Würzburg, Bavaria, on March 13, 1883. Von Schobert entered the Royal Bavarian Army in July 1902. He was early on connected with aviation and promoted the Augsburg local balloon club in the 1920s. He fought on the Western Front during WW1 and was awarded the Max Joseph military order, together with the knighthood. After the war, he remained in the army and was promoted to major general in 1934, and general of the infantry on 1 February 1938. At the beginning of WW2 during the Campaign of Poland, he assumed command of the 7th Army Corps of Army Group South under Von Rundstedt. At the outset of the Campaign of France in May 1940, Schobert’s Corps belonged to the 16th Army of Army Group A, again led by von Rundstedt. On May 24 1941, Schobert took on his function as Commander in Chief of the German troops in Romania tasked with the protection of Romanian oil fields at Ploieşti, in case of a Red Army invasion (Deutschen Militärmission in Rumänien). During Operation Barbarossa, the Romanian 3rd Army was subordinated to the German 11th Army commanded by von Schobert. On September 12 1941, when the LIV. Army Corps reached the isthmus of Perekop, Colonel General von Schobert died in a crash after landing his liaison aircraft in a minefield. General of the Infantry Erich von Manstein replaced him as head of the 11th Army.
Written by Dr. Eric G. L. Pinzelli
Happy gaming!
Michał & PHALANX Team
Stretch Goals Description
over 4 years ago
– Tue, Dec 03, 2019 at 05:23:11 PM
Hello Everyone,
We are starting today the final 10-day period of our campaign, and we have prepared some interesting content for you during these days!
Today we will provide you a description of stretch goals and their impact on the game.
Tomorrow we will publish the beta version of the Rulebook, showing you 99% of the final game rules.
Starting on Friday, 1941. Race to Moscow will be demoed at PAX Unplugged 2019 (https://unplugged.paxsite.com/)! We will give you more detailed info soon.
Stretch Goals Description
We still have some goals to be taken. What will they bring to the game?
1) Army Group Nord Ju-87 sculpt gets upgraded to Ju-88. New sculpt represents one of the most important Luftwaffe’s aircraft, serving as a bomber, reconnaissance aircraft, and even a heavy fighter/night fighter. The new shape makes it easier to determine whose aircraft is currently on the mission.
2) Army Group Sud Ju-87 sculpt gets upgraded to He-111. New sculpt represents the “workhorse” of the Luftwaffe. It was a transport aircraft converted to a tactical bomber. The new shape makes it easier to determine whose aircraft is currently on the mission.
3) Army Group Mitte Pz II sculpt gets upgraded to Pz III. New sculpt represents German main battle tank, which played an important role during the campaign. Second Panzergruppe, commanded by the famous general Guderian, had the most of this tank type among all other Panzer Groups.
4) Army Group Sud Pz II sculpt gets upgraded to Pz IV. New sculpt represents the heaviest German tank at the time, still inferior to T-34, KV-1 and KV-2. Nevertheless, one Panzergruppe managed to deal with the much superior Soviet Tank forces, thus it deserves to be represented with Pz IV rather than the obsolete Pz II.
5) Three player markers for the turn track upgrade to plastic Volkswagen Kubelwagen miniatures in player colors. Volkswagen Kubelwagen was an interesting car in the Wehrmacht’s service. It was based on the famous VW Beetle and designed by Ferdinand Porsche as well. Since the vehicle was useful and durable in different terrain and winter conditions, we hope that its miniature can serve well as player markers too.
6) Three HQ counters upgrade to plastic Mercedes-Benz W31 Wehrmacht Staff Car miniatures in player colors. We all know the famous Jeeps for the GI. But the Wehrmacht officials had cool cars too. The six-wheel Mercedes is a much better looking HQ marker than an ordinary counter. Placing such a Staff Car near the OKH deck will give you more of a feeling that you are visiting the High Command and persuade them to provide you with some extra support.
These goals will add a lot of visual variety, making 1941. Race to Moscow even more beautiful. It would be great to fund them all!
7) Logistic Cards replace the Logistics Chart on the board. These are three large (12 x 8 cm) double-sided cards, which help players to organize trucks and trains in their pool. For each of two logistics levels, all necessary information about how many transports you may take, place, or possess is provided on the card. The need for such cards has been requested by our fellow playtesters. With them, your entire pool of resources is organized and you can concentrate fully on finding the most efficient way to Moscow.
To fund these cards we need to reach £75.000 and spend 50 interactions. Over the weekend you collected 136 new interactions, increasing your total to 459! Reducing this by 200 for previously funded stretch goals you still have a nice sum to live with. To get more (and invite more folks here to support this campaign) please like, share, and comment on these social media links:
“If You Know the Enemy and Know Yourself, You Need Not Fear the Result of a Hundred Battles.”
Last week we discussed Soviet army and commanders, and this week you will read here about Axis troops, command, and… logistics! Enjoy!
AXIS FORCES DEPLOYED FOR OPERATION BARBAROSSA IN JUNE 1941
The Wehrmacht overran Denmark, Norway, the Luxembourg, Belgium, the Netherlands, France and ousted the B.E.F in less than three months. These campaigns had taken their toll however, and Hitler needed time to consolidate and to move on to his future objectives. From the Campaign of France to Operation Barbarossa, the German army increased from 4,347,000 men on June 15, 1940 to 5,200,000 men exactly one year later (with the overall Wehrmacht reaching 7,309,000 men in June 1941, more than 1.5 million men larger than the year before). By June 1941, the Kriegsmarine had 404,000 men, more than twice the 189,000 personnel as in June 1940. The Luftwaffe went from 1,104,000 men to 1,545,000 men, and the Waffen-SS went from 125,000 to 160,000 men. In June 1941, around 3.35 million troops were available for Operation Barbarossa. The Romanian army contributed 600,000 men to this, and in the north, Finland had already mobilized its army and could muster 530,000 men. These forces would later be reinforced by units from Italy, Croatia, Slovakia, and Hungary. The fighting spirit and confidence were at their height before taking on the gigantic Soviet Union. Nazi Germany boasted a thoroughly planned organization of forces, and its system of command and control was well organized at all levels.
Germany’s industry and its armed forces were generally characterized by a very high level of technical and scientific knowledge. In the year leading up to Barbarossa, German factories produced 2,122 panzers, 353 StuG, 268 armored cars, 138,806 trucks, towing vehicles, staff cars and other such soft-skinned vehicles, 3,649 anti-tank guns, 1,475 infantry guns, 781 light and 361 heavy field howitzers, 6,754 anti-aircraft guns, 12,471 mortars, and could rely upon massive stocks of captured war material from Czechoslovakia, France, Britain, Poland, most of which was as good as German weaponry. It was Czechoslovakia’s defense industry that Germany used the most, producing tanks, artillery systems, optical instruments, communications equipment, and other items for the Wehrmacht. These combined with German factory output had been such that the Luftwaffe was able to amass 3,904 aircraft for Barbarossa (with 1,766 aircraft in the Mediterranean and elsewhere) while Germany's Axis allies deployed another 1,025 aircraft. As stated by Andrei A. Kokoshin (The German Blitzkrieg against the USSR, 2016), in 1941 “the might of the Wehrmacht lay in the quality of its personnel, its optimized organizational decisions (regarding operations in tank groups, air fleets and other formations), its top-notch operational art and tactics, and in the fact that many of its weapons systems and military technologies were well matched to the blitzkrieg’s objectives.”
The quality of German armor had also improved by June 1941 over that of the previous year. Speed was more important than firepower and armor protection for German tanks from 1939 to 1941. Whereas more than half the panzers deployed in France in May 1940 were light Panzer I and II variants, by June 1941 less than a third of the panzer division's tank strength were in these largely obsolete vehicles, with fully two-thirds of each division's panzer complement comprised of the far more capable Pz 35/38t, Panzer III/IV, and StuG (assault guns). Medium tanks accounted for 44% of the total number of tanks that the Wehrmacht allocated for Barbarossa. Most importantly, the Panzer III, arguably the main battle tank of the German army in 1941, had been significantly improved by the summer of 1941. The Panzer III would remain the mainstay of the German armor until late 1942. The Panzer IV, conceived by Heinz Guderian and developed from 1936 as a support medium tank, was available in limited quantities during the battle of France, but formed a large part of the Wehrmacht in the summer of 1941. It borrowed many components from the Panzer III, but mounted a 75mm howitzer intended to deal against fortified positions. After meeting superior KVs and T-34 tanks, under the insistence of Hitler and Eastern Front generals, two new design were quickly put on the drawing board. German leadership paid considerable attention to reorganizing the Wehrmacht and introducing technological modifications. The Panzer V, also called the Panther, and the Tiger (or Panzer VI), were meant as an answer to the shortcomings of their predecessors. Aware of the Soviet numerical superiority in tanks, the German command had also given high priority to the saturation of its troops with anti-tank weapons. The Wehrmacht’s 88-mm anti-aircraft gun was perhaps one of the best-known guns of WWII, being used effectively to destroy both enemy tanks and field fortifications. German field armies showed their tactical superiority to maximum advantage in the vast space of the Central Ukraine: During the summer of 1941 the defending Soviet armies could neither move fast enough to escape nor stand and fight the Germans effectively enough to counter them.
GERMAN INFANTRY AT THE START OF OPERATION BARBAROSSA
"On a man for man basis, German ground soldiers consistently inflicted casualties at about a 50% higher rate than they incurred from the opposing British and American troops under all circumstances. This was true when they were attacking and when they were defending, when they had a local numerical superiority and when, as was usually the case, they were outnumbered, when they had air superiority and when they did not, when they won and when they lost." - Col. Trevor N. Dupuy, A Genius for War: The German Army and the General Staff, 1807-1945 (1977).
During WW2 the German Army raised more than 300 infantry divisions. Infantry divisions were the core of the German Army and they had a variety of designations and specializations. Of the 154 divisions deployed against the Soviet Union in June 1941, including reserves, there were 100 infantry, 19 panzer, 11 motorized, 9 security, 5 Waffen-SS, 4 "light", 4 mountain, 1 SS police, and 1 cavalry. A typical combined-arms infantry division in June 1941 had 17,734 men organized in 3 regiments each with 3 battalions. The division was armed with 75 guns (from 75mm to 170mm); 147 mortars; 75 anti-tank guns; 138 heavy and 378 light machine guns; and 12 anti-aircraft guns.
The infantry platoons had far more freedom of action than that of other nations. It was left to the men on the ground to decide the most appropriate way of achieving their objective, and junior officers were encouraged to choose the most aggressive choice if appropriate. The infantry's mission was to open gaps for the armored forces that would emerge suddenly, thus achieving complete surprise. “German machine-guns, mortars, machine-pistols, antitank weapons and armored personnel carriers were all superior to those of Britain and America. Above all, Germany possessed better tanks”. - Max Hastings, Overlord (1984). German infantry training created a strong esprit de corps among the men of a platoon. Despite the heavy losses and reduction in quality of some units as the war dragged on, there was always a small core of experienced men that led by example and maintained a strong sense of purpose and discipline. In October 1942, all infantry regiments were redesignated “Grenadier” regiments, mostly to boost the morale of the troops.
During the first phase of Operation Barbarossa, the main problem confronting all three army groups was to keep the infantry from falling too far behind the armored divisions. The infantry divisions, with their horse-drawn vehicles, could not help being delayed whenever they were engaged in completing encirclements or in mopping up pockets. The Army's low strength in motorized infantry divisions (because of the constant materiel shortage, the Wehrmacht had only 14 such divisions) proved to be a real handicap. The German Army did not have sufficient motor vehicles, planes, and reserves for operations in such vast a theater as the Soviet Union. Instead of being able to take full advantage of their maneuverability, the panzer divisions were often forced to halt to wait for the arrival of the infantry.
In Europe and Africa, the Wehrmacht was the most formidable fighting force until at least 1943. At all levels, it possessed qualities of daring and adaptability, and a capacity to react to the rapidly changing battlefield situation. The qualities of the German soldier and the ability of commanders at all levels to think and act independently and effectively, were key to German victories. Despite the striking initial successes, German manpower and inadequate logistics planning were the reasons for the Wehrmacht’s undoing. It’s inability to maintain its armored and infantry strength gradually diminished its offensive capabilities, while the Soviets were increasing their own. After one month of fighting on the Eastern Front, the effective strength of the German infantry divisions had been reduced by approximately 20% and that of the panzer and motorized infantry divisions by 50%. At the beginning of November, the combat efficiency of the infantry divisions had dropped by 35%, and that of the armored divisions by 40 to 50%. Infantry companies were now at half strength, the average number of men available for combat duty varied from 50 to 60 per company. Moscow seemed farther and farther away. From 1941 to 1945, the Soviet Union harnessed its much more abundant natural resources and manpower reserves to turn out far greater quantities of weapons, bombers, fighter planes, tanks, and artillery. Some 80% of Germany’s armed forces were eventually destroyed on the Eastern Front.
